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In recent years, the cellular phone has evolved into much more than a device for
making calls. The combination of the PDA, digital media player, and cellular phone
has become known as the smart phone. These smart phones are becoming more
powerful with each generation and, with a big push from companies such as Apple
and Google, are quickly becoming a necessary tool for many. The cellular network
has seen numerous upgrades over the last few years to handle the increased load and
demand required by newer, faster services. The mixed availability of services from
region to region means that phones must support a wide array of protocols in order
to ensure quality of service.
Due to the number and complexity of cellular protocols, baseband chipsets are
used to handle all cellular network functions of these phones. A baseband chipset
is often a physically separated system with its own CPU and operating system that
communicates with the application CPU through either a bus or shared memory.
These chips serve two purposes. They avoid having to redevelop cellular network
functionality with each new phone and prevent the smart phone functionality from
interfering with the cellular network.
The separation of the application and the baseband CPUs prevents user applica-
tions from directly manipulating cellular tra c. This separation is necessary because
the cellular network was not designed with very strict security requirements. Cellular
tra c can be encrypted, but there are few defenses between the phones and the tow-
ers. The phones trust that they receive well-formed and accurate information from
the tower. When towers were very expensive, this posed little threat to the end users,
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but today towers are cheap and can be carried in a backpack. Baseband systems o↵er
little protection against memory corruption attacks lunched from malevolent tower
as researcher Ralf-Philipp Weinmann has shown [27].
This thesis investigates the security testing of the baseband system. I developed
a testing environment that is isolated to protect the existing cellular network. Using
the testbed, I developed a fuzzer for SMS messages. I reversed the cellular baseband




2.1 Software Memory Corruption
Memory corruption vulnerabilities plague the computing world. These vulnerabilities
allow for an attacker to take control of the software running on a system. Although
many defenses have been proposed and implemented, these vulnerabilities still exist
in many systems today. Memory corruption vulnerabilities are the result of the pro-
grammer making a simple mistake with the low level management of the system. The
more complex the system, the more likely the programmers are to make a mistake.
Companies like Microsoft have developed processes such as SDL to help minimize the
number of mistakes, but only a single mistake is necessary to compromise the system.
The two categories of memory corruption vulnerabilities that lead to compromise will
be discussed below.
Stack-based overflows are the result of improper handling of the stack resulting
in compromised control flow. This type of vulnerability was introduced to the world
in the paper “Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit” by Aleph One [16]. In this
tutorial, Aleph One walks through the dangers of the standard library functions in
the C programming language. He demonstrates this on a common x86 processor
and a Linux based operating system, but the basic principles have been applied to a
variety of architectures and operating systems. The vulnerability is the result of the
instruction pointer being pushed onto the stack when a function call is made. If this
data is overwritten, then clearly the attacker has control of execution. Initially, these
vulnerabilities were very dangerous as they were easy to discover and exploit. Today,
this type of vulnerability is easy to find and repair, as well, and most traditional
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computer systems have been patched. Cellular basebands, on the other hand, are
large, complex systems that are expensive to maintain and are rarely updated, so
they may still be vulnerable to this type of attack.
The second type of vulnerability is caused when the programmer mismanages the
heap memory resulting in a heap overflow. This type of vulnerability was popularized
in the paper “w00w00 on Heap Overflows” by Matt Conover and is much harder to
exploit than a stack-based overflow but is also harder to find and repair [18]. Conover
shows that overwriting the heap metadata can result in the attacker gaining control.
Like stack-based overflows, heap overflows occur when the programmer has made
an error. Conover acknowledges that there are no complete solutions for protection
aside from fixing the code. Unlike stack-based overflows, heap overflows are commonly
found in systems today.
Fuzzing is the process of giving the program many bad inputs, monitoring be-
havior, and seeing if a vulnerability can be found [13]. The two classes of fuzzers
are known as smart and dumb fuzzers. Smart fuzzers are intelligent about the bad
inputs it produces and attempts to get better results while dumb fuzzers produces
random input or randomly perturbs good input. Many security researchers have used
fuzzers to find security vulnerabilities in popular desktop applications. Microsoft
has recognized the importance of fuzz test and have integrated it into SDL (security
development lifecycle) [13].
2.2 Embedded Systems Security Research
Embedded systems are hard to define, but they are generally headless systems that
are embedded in a device that serves a few dedicated tasks. Due to decreasing com-
puting costs and increasing device complexity these systems have become more like
traditional computing environments and are exposed to networks. These systems in-
clude a wide range of devices including printers, routers, network cards, ATMs, and
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cellular basebands. Researchers have shown that many of these systems are designed
without security in mind. Arrigo Triulzi and Guillaume Delugré have shown that
network cards have flaws that can lead to compromise [26, 19]. They demonstrated
that exploits in a network card’s firmware can lead to the attacker having control of
the network card and thus all of the data the computer sends and receives over the
network. Their work mostly focuses on the specifics of the network cards beginning
tested, but the impact is the same as that of a baseband attack. These systems are
harder to patch than traditional software and many people are not aware of their
existence. Although not as apparent to the user, these systems play a critical role.
Embedded systems are harder to analyze for security vulnerabilities than more
traditional applications. They are often complicated and interact very closely with
their specific hardware. Debugging them often requires special software and hardware.
These systems are protected as trade secrets and the source code is rarely available.
They are also a lot harder to defend. Currently systems are designed to trust their
embedded systems and have little to no defense in the event that one is compromised.
Researchers Löıc Duflot, Yves-Alexis Perez, and Benjamin Morin have demonstrated
that the integrity of a network card can be monitored to detect attacks [20]. They
implemented a series of run time firmware integrity checks and were able to detect an
attack. They concluded that while it is possible to monitor the integrity of a system’s
firmware, it is still a hard problem and is very system specific.
2.3 Baseband Security
The baseband system in a cellular phone is responsible for communicating with the
cellular towers on behalf of a phone. It is most closely related to a network card
in a computer. Weinmann demonstrated the first public attack on the baseband of
a smart phone at the Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin [27]. His research
revealed that most systems lacked even the most basic forms of exploit mitigations
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and were very vulnerable to attacks. He also confirmed that an attack tower can be
constructed on a modest budget and can be made fairly portable. Then he showed
that an attack could take control of the cellular baseband and deliver a range of
payloads from recording all tra c to turning the cell phone into a bug that records
audio from the microphone and sends it to the attacker. Later, these attacks were
shown to a↵ect feature phones as well by researchers Nico Golde and Collin Mulliner
[22]. They used specially crafted SMS messages to attack a wide variety of cellular
phones with a similar setup to Weinmann.
2.4 GSM
GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication)[1] is a set of standards for cellular
networks and for devices to communicate with these networks. These standards have
had several additions over time and although many have their own names, most are
colloquially called GSM.
The GSM has been the target of attacks in the past. Many of these attacks have
been on di↵erent protocols specified by GSM itself. Most of these attacks, however,
have resulted in a denial of service attack or compromising a message or call [25].
These vulnerabilities have not attacked a user’s cellphone, but instead compromised
the data it sends. Although, a baseband attack does involve the GSM network layer,
the exploited target is the processor in the user’s cell phone not the network.
2.5 OpenBTS
The OpenBTS project is an open source implementation of the GSM stack [9]. When
coupled with a software radio, it provides a programmable base transceiver station
which allows us to have full control of the cellular network. This control enables
us to send malformed data without the fear of interfering with the public’s cellular
service. While, the OpenBTS system is complicated to setup and run, “OpenBTS




Another method for finding memory corruption vulnerabilities is reverse engineering
which involves reconstructing the program from the compiled binaries and attempting
to find the programmer’s mistakes. It is a time-intensive practice, but this is how
Weinmann found baseband vulnerabilities in the past [27]. The standard tool used
for reverse engineering is IDA Pro sold by Hex-Rays [6]. This tool contains little
documentation, however Chris Eagle has written a comprehensive book on the tool
[21].
2.7 Conclusion
Since their introduction, memory corruption vulnerabilities have plagued software.
They have resulted in the loss of countless dollars and resulted in attackers compro-
mising numerous systems. These vulnerabilities are well understood on traditional
computing systems and defenses have been in development for years. Until very re-
cently, however, little work had been done in the public sector with the security of
embedded systems to prevent the same attacks. Given the rise of the smart phone
and the fact that more and more people and businesses are relying on them every
day, the security of these systems is critical. The baseband of the phone is its link
to the rest of the network, and controlling it results in controlling the phone. This




3.1 Reversing the Baseband
Since little information was available on the cellular baseband of the HTC Dream
(commonly known in the United States, and hence referred to, as the G1) reversing the
baseband’s firmware was critical for understanding the inner workings of the system.
The primary tool used for almost all reverse engineering of software today is IDA Pro,
and it was used extensively in the reversing of the baseband system. The baseband
on the G1 uses the ARM architecture which is supported by IDA Pro. Additional
plugins were written and purchased to aid in the reversing. The goal was to use
strings found in the source and disassembled functions to locate standard C library
functions known to cause security vulnerabilities. Using IDA Pro’s graphing ability,
I determined which function has the greatest indegree on the call graph. I needed
to write automated scripts to process portions of the code because the disassembled
baseband is over 250MB. This was too large for a timely manual inspection.
3.2 Creating the Testing Environment
A testing environment is required to launch a baseband attack. The environment
must be able to simulate the over-the-air connection between the tower and the cellu-
lar phone. This connection in GSM is handled by the Um interface which is respon-
sible for the communication between the towers and the phones. In order to simulate
this connection, I used OpenBTS with appropriate hardware. The OpenBTS project
utilizes a software radio to implement the Um interface in an open source Unix ap-
plication. This allows for complete control of the protocol through software so the
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environment is not limited to baseband attacks. The OpenBTS system can be used
for any application that requires the manipulation and control of the Um interface.
3.3 Using Information from Reversing
Any vulnerable functions discovered in the reversing above can be used to construct
an exploit. This process involves determining what data sent by the tower is processed
by the vulnerable functions and corrupting it. The goal is to cause the memory in
the system to become corrupted and to gain flow control. If I can gain control of the
instruction register or overwrite a function pointer, then I have control of the service.
3.4 Fuzzing
A fuzzing setup was contracted to aid in the discovery of vulnerabilities. A dumb
fuzzer will send either random data or slightly perturbed good input to the phone
in the hope that it will crash. A smart fuzzer is a program that can generate the
data based on some set of rules. I reprogramed OpenBTS to function as a fuzzer
and attack any phone on its network. I was hoping the baseband would crash while
processing some corrupt data. A crash while parsing data is a good sign that memory
corruption has occurred. Given the nature of fuzzing, it was necessary to automate
this process. It is important to remember when fuzzing that the bug is the point of
interest, not the crashes. Not all crashes lead to attacker control of the system. If
control cannot be gained, a denial of service exploit may be possible depending on
if/how the operating system attempts to recover.
3.5 Understand Capabilities and Design of the Baseband
System
In order to understand the impact of a baseband attack, it is first necessary to un-
derstand the capabilities of the baseband system. This varies from system to system
so I limited my focus to the baseband of the G1. Important capabilities to examine
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were its communication to the application CPU, memory access (preliminary research
indicates that it may have DMA to all of the application CPUs memory), and cellu-
lar capabilities. Understanding of the capabilities and the operating system on the
baseband came from a combination of reverse engineering and research. It was nec-
essary to learn as much as possible about the workings of the baseband. Using the
code recovered in the reverse engineering described above, any source code available
online, the work already done by the jailbreak communities, and any documentation
o↵ered by the component suppliers were all necessary to get as complete of a picture
as possible.
3.6 Application Operating System Defenses
The baseband system is installed by the manufacturer of the phone and is often
inaccessible to the user. The application CPU is therefore the easiest place to install
defenses. On the G1 the application CPU will be running Android which is open
source and based on the Linux kernel, so the information about its design is extensive.
The research done to determine the impact helped understand how the baseband
interacts with the rest of the system. Safe-guarding these links will be the key to
defense. There is most certainly little the application can do to prevent a baseband
attack, but it could possibly be able to detect and recover from an attack to minimize
the damage. This may require reworking the operating systems trust model to be
able to treat the baseband system as hostile. This is time consuming to implement
and would most likely require extending the Android kernel and interfacing with a
proprietary system (the baseband). However, similar designs could provide guidance





The baseband firmware was downloaded from an HTC support site. The firmware
was not immediately recognizable as a standard executable format. It was suspected
that the binary maybe an ELF file with a special header given other researchers had
encountered this format. I confirmed this finding with an online post [12] and that
the baseband was running the OKL4 microkernel developed by OK Labs [8]. This
is a common kernel for embedded devices and in itself provides nothing but basic
operating system functionality. I suspect the baseband functionality is provided by
services running on top of the OKL4 kernel. Given that all of the baseband code
was packed together in a single binary file, the amount of disassembled code was
enormous. I developed some Python scripts that attempted to graph out the code to
find functions of interest, but the results were inconclusive. The older version of IDA
Pro I was using seems to have trouble dealing with the ARM code and the volume
of code being processed. A newer version of IDA Pro was ordered, but I have yet to
receive it. The Hex-Rays decompiler [7] was also ordered and may have proven useful,
but I have have yet to receive it. Another idea was to compile the Open Source OKL4
Kernel and use Zynamics BinDi↵ [14] to locate interesting functions such as strcpy
and memcpy, however, BinDi↵ requires the newest version of IDA Pro. Zynamics
also makes a tool, BinNavi [15], that is designed to help with finding vulnerabilities
in binaries, but again it requires the newest version of IDA Pro.
11
4.2 Lab Setup
A cellular testbed was developed as I carried out my research. A USRP 1 software
programmable radio that was modified to operate on GSM frequencies was combined
with the OpenBTS software stack. This gave us access to everything needed to
emulate the tra c that occurs between a cellular radio and the BTS.
One problem with running such a lab is the legality of transmitting on the fre-
quencies used by GSM. Without a license from the FCC it is illegal to transmit on
those frequencies at the power levels necessary. Another issue is 911 service. Calls
to 911 emergency services are referred to as SOS calls. When making an SOS call,
a cellular phone does not care which tower it is transmitting to and all towers must
accept any SOS call. This is why if you pick up any cell phone (even one that has
not been activated) and dial 911 the call will go through as long as you are in range
of a tower. This presents a problem with running our testbed. If our tower was
given an SOS call, it could not route the call because we are not connected to the
phone network. To prevent any incident, we place the testbed in a shielded box that
prevents any signal from leaking out or getting in. This ensures that only test phones
inside the box can connect to the network.
The network itself has had some issues. The OpenBTS software is very unstable
and has many issues that had to be fixed or worked around. Once the software was
stable enough to begin testing, we ran into an interesting issue with our setup. Every
phone tested can see the network, but none can connect. We can confirm that it is
indeed our network that the phones are seeing, because if we change the MCC and
MNC (numbers that identify the carrier to the phone) the network changes names.
For example, if we can set the MCC to 310 and the MNC to 410 and the phone
see the network as AT&T and if we change the MNC to 260 it shows the network
as T-Mobile. We have tried many combinations of phones and SIM cards and none
seem to work. We are in ongoing communication with the company that sold us the
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USRP 1 and are attempting to trouble shoot the issue. Our current best guess is
there is something wrong with our hardware.
4.3 Fuzzing
Although the cellular testbed is not yet in a state were the fuzzer can be run, I did
research and developed a fuzzer while waiting for the components of the testbed to
arrive. The fuzzer was built by modifying the OpenBTS software to send malformed
packets to any phone connecting to the network. Due to the nature of the setup,
some significant changes had to be made compared to a traditional fuzzer.
Traditional fuzzers are attacking a piece of software and are running on the same
systems as the target. They can use a debugger to determine if the software has
crashed so they know when they have found something interesting. In our case, the
fuzzer is completely separated from the target. To solve this problem, two changes
were made from a traditional fuzzing setup.
The first change that was made was that all randomness was removed from the
fuzzer. Fuzzers typically mutate data randomly, although they sometimes follow
certain rules. The fuzzer I developed ran through its test deterministically and, most
importantly, repeatably. To do this, I use a list of bytes that are commonly significant
for program control such as a null byte and the using a loop: take a valid SMS message,
send the message with a byte replaced with the control byte, and repeat for every
byte in the message. This limits to number of test cases run, but this was necessary
given the constraints on the environment.
The second change involves the recording of the results. A traditional fuzzer such
as Peach [10] uses a debugger to determine if a program has crashed. Then it may use
a program such as !exploitable [3] or crashwrangler [2] to determine the likelihood of
the crash being exploitable. In the case of our cellular testing, attaching a debugger
was not possible. Instead, a normal (not fuzzed) SMS message was sent between each
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test. The message contained an incrementing counter. This would allow us to trace
back to determine which iteration caused the crash.
The GSM protocol is a very large attack surface for fuzzing. It is a very complex
protocol with lots of extensions. For the purposes of our tests, I focused on the SMS
protocol. The standard SMS protocol in the United States sends messages using the 7
bit GSM character set. I focused on fuzzing the message field with a mutation engine




5.1 Impact of Successful Attack
If an attacker can gain control of a target’s baseband then they have gained a sig-
nificant amount of power. The baseband system controls all network access to the
phone. With the rise in popularity of smartphones, more and more businesses have
become reliant on them. There are many possible impacts of this type of attack.
5.1.1 Espionage
Espionage is the most obvious impact from a baseband attack. The attacker would be
able to examine any and all network tra c from the device. Today, smartphones pull
email, calendars, and files, often automatically. These would be intercepted by the
attacker who could also make requests as if he were the user. End-to-end encryption
in a high layer would help mitigate this attack. However, it is unclear what other
accesses the baseband has to the rest of the system. It maybe possible for it to access
the data on the smartphone in which case the attacker can simply steal the encryption
keys. The amount of access the baseband has to the rest of the system is dependent
on the design of the particular phone. The phone functionality of the baseband may
also be used to spy on the user. The cellular phone can be activated without ringing
the phone[27]. This e↵ectively turns the phone into a bug.
5.1.2 Denial of service
Another attack that is a more likely threat, because it requires less work, is the launch-
ing of a denial of service attack the could disrupt cellular service. This attack could
target specific users or attack all users in range. It would cripple the communication
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of the users cellphone until it could be repaired or the user could find a replacement.
This could be used to prevent a user from contacting emergency services in the event
of an attack. The country of Georgia claims that Russia launched a denial of service
attack in coordination with a physical one [24]. It is reasonable to believe that these
types of coordinated attacks will become more popular as countries become more
dependent on their networks.
5.1.3 Identity Theft
As smartphones become more prevalent, more functionality is being shifted onto them.
Google has introduced google wallet which allows an Android smartphone to replace
your credit card [5]. Credit card swipers have been used to steal card information for
quite some time, however, if all of the information is on the phone, then the attackers
can execute the attack wirelessly. This would allow an attacker to setup in a busy
confined space such as an airport or shopping mall and steal the identities of any user
in range.
5.2 Possible Attackers
There are two categories of attackers in most cyber attacks. Governments are invest-
ing heavily in cyber warfare and criminals continue to exploit new technologies for
commercial gain.
5.2.1 Governments
It is well known that governments utilize the cellular networks to fight crime and spy
on their citizens. It has never been confirmed but it is reasonable to assume that
several governments have back doors into users cellphones and are able to use them
for espionage purposes. In the case of monitoring domestic phones, the government
would not need a baseband exploit since that control they network and to some extent




Criminals are continuously looking for new vectors to carry out attacks. They have
proven to be quick to adapt to new technologies and have already started to carry
out attacks on smart phones. Although, baseband attacks are an excellent vector for
attack, they do pose some threats to the criminals executing them. These threats
will be addressed in the defenses section.
5.3 Defenses
Currently, no defenses exists to protect against a baseband attack. Defending against
these attacks is di cult because there has been little research done on them.
5.3.1 In Phone Defenses
There is little a phone can do to defend itself against a baseband attack. This is
especially true if the cellular protocols themselves cannot be modified to provide
strong authentication. One approach would be to add up to date exploit mitigations
to baseband systems. These mitigations are present in desktop systems and have
yet to prevent exploitation, but have increased the time and e↵ort needed to develop
an exploit. Another solution would to implement some monitoring functionality so
that the integrity of the baseband could be monitored from the application CPU.
This would require major changes and it is unclear how a monitor could be trusted
if the baseband is compromised. All of these techniques have a overhead to them
that would increase the complexity of the systems, requiring more powerful chips and
more power, thus lowering the phones battery life.
5.3.2 Network Defenses
Since performing a baseband attack requires broadcasting, defense can be placed in
the cell towers themselves. Towers can be monitoring for any rogue towers and can
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alert the authorities when one is detected. There is little a tower can do for the user.
They cannot reliably contact the user since the attacker now controls his phone. The
carriers could blacklist the target and prevent them from getting network access, but if
the purpose of attack was to deny service then carriers are only assisting the attackers.
The network itself could be upgraded so that phones could cryptographically verify
that they were connecting to a carrier tower, but this would require a major overhaul
of both the cellular networks and the phones.
5.3.3 Proximity
The primary defense against this attack is proximity. An attacking tower must be in
range of its target. The attacker is also transmitting a powerful radio signal that can
be used to locate the tower. The farther the attacker must be from the target the
more powerful the signal must be broadcasting. An attacker could mitigate this risk
by using a directional antenna or using a very low power transmitter and getting very
close to his target. The attackers can also remain mobile given that our entire testbed
could easily fit in a backpack. Coupled with some batteries, an attacker maybe able




Everyday society relies more on cellular networks to survive. The next generation
of devices are being built on these networks. For years, desktop systems have been
plagued by security vulnerabilities that have been studied and mitigated. These
vulnerabilities have begun to surface in smartphones and the mitigations for desktops
have been applied. However, smart phones have additional systems that desktops
do not. The security of these systems is largely unstudied, but they have already
been deployed in the field. The baseband is an example of one such system where
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Directed by Assistant Professor Jonathon T. Gi n
Memory corruption vulnerabilities have been exploited by attackers to com-
promise systems for years. Traditional computing systems have had years of defenses
developed for them such as ASLR and DEP. However, these technologies have not
been implemented in embedded systems. Embedded systems have great power in a
computing system and control many critical functions. If an attacker can compromise
one of these systems, such as a network interface, then it is a serious threat. In a
cellular network the network interface is known as the baseband. Cellular protocols
are far more complex than traditional network protocols, so a few companies o↵er
systems that can be integrated into a phone. The cellular network is becoming the
primary communication network for many and disrupting cellular communication can
have a devastating impact. I hope to find a memory corruption vulnerability in the
baseband of a cellular phone and develop defenses to protect the phone against it.
